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I. INTRODUCTION
Tekky Toys, the creative geniuses that originated the idea for a farting
plush doll, are very protective of their masterpiece - Pull My Finger® Fred.
After discovering that Novelty, Inc. was producing similar farting dolls,
Tekky Toys sued for copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and
unfair competition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit repri-
manded Novelty, Inc. severely when it upheld the district court's award of
damages. The Seventh Circuit awarded damages based on lost profits result-
ing from copyright and trademark infringement, punitive damages under
state unfair competition law, and attorneys' fees worth approximately twice
the total damages awarded. But was it really fair to allow Tekky Toys to
recover compensatory damages under the Lanham Act, plus punitive dam-
ages under a state law claim for unfair competition, when the Lanham Act
provides that damages for trademark infringement "shall constitute compen-
sation and not a penalty?"' Or should the Lanham Act preempt the state law
remedy allowing punitive damages?
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Tekky Toys received a copyright for their "plush toy with sound" in
February 2001 under its "Pull My Finger" mark. Pull My Finger® Fred "is a
plush doll and when one squeezes Fred's extended finger on his right hand,
he farts. He also makes somewhat crude, somewhat funny statements about
the bodily noises he emits, such as 'Did somebody step on a duck?' or 'Silent
but deadly."2 After seeing Fred at a tradeshow in Hong Kong, Todd Green,
President of Novelty, Inc., went back to his art director and had her design a
similar doll, which they named Fartman. Novelty began manufacturing their
farting dolls in October 2001. In his testimony, Green admitted to basing the
Fartman doll on Pull My Finger® Fred.3 In the Seventh Circuit's opinion,
Justice Wood described the striking similarities of the two dolls:
[B]oth are plush dolls of middle-aged men sitting in arm-chairs
that fart and tell jokes. Both have crooked smiles that show their
teeth, balding heads with a fringe of black hair, a rather large pro-
truding nose, blue pants that are identical colors, and white tank
tops. On the other hand, Fartman has his name emblazoned in red
across his chest, his shoes are a different color from Fred's, as is
his chair, and Fartman wears a hat. In the end, despite the small
* J.D. candidate May 2009 SMU Dedman School of Law; Associate Case Note
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1. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006).
2. JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 912 (7th Cir. 2007).
3. Id. at 913.
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cosmetic differences, the two dolls give off more than a similar
air. The problem is not that both Fred and Fartman have black
hair or white tank tops or any other single detail; the problem is
that the execution and combination of features on both dolls
would lead an objective observer to think they were the same.4
Tekky Toys initiated this suit against Novelty, Inc. in March 2002 after
learning about Fartman.
III. DESCRIPTION OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
Tekky Toys filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, alleging that Novelty, Inc.'s actions constituted copyright
infringement, violations of the Lanham Act, violations of the Illinois Unfair
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and unfair competition under state common
law.5 The district court's jurisdiction was based on subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the federal claims (copyright and trademark infringement) and sup-
plemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Tekky Toys' federal cause
of action for trademark infringement is more particularly described in its
Amended Complaint:
Novelty's use of the "Pull My Finger" mark and sales of its alleg-
edly infringing toys "constitutes use of a false designation of ori-
gin, description and representation . . . [and] wrongfully and
falsely designates, describes or represents Plaintiff's goods, caus-
ing confusion, reverse confusion, mistake and deception as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of Novelty's goods with
Plaintiff' in violation of Section 1125(a) of the Lanham Act (fed-
eral unfair competition).6
Tekky Toys' state law claim was based on the argument that Novelty en-
gaged in unfair competition in violation of Illinois law by misappropriating
Tekky Toys' "valuable property rights," and by trading on the goodwill rep-
resented by Tekky Toys' products, which was likely to cause confusion and
deceive the public.7 The pleadings illustrated that the state law unfair com-
petition claim mirrored the federal law unfair competition claim. However,
the state law claim was broader and potentially easier to establish; thus a
plaintiff who can prove federal unfair competition will likely prevail on the
state law claim as well.
4. Id. at 916.
5. JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., No. 02-C-4950, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3077,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2003).
6. Id. (quoting Amended Complaint at 5, JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., No. 02-
C-4950, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3077 (N.D. I11. Mar. 4, 2003)).
7. Id. (quoting at Amended Complaint at 6, JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., No.
02-C-4950, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3077 (N.D. I11. Mar. 4, 2003)).
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IV. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE HISTORY
Ruling on a pre-trial motion, the district court was faced with the diffi-
cult question of whether the Lanham Act preempts state law remedies for
unfair competition. After two unsuccessful attempts, Tekky Toys filed a mo-
tion to compel an answer to its discovery request for Novelty's financial
statements and tax returns. Novelty refused to produce the documents on the
basis of irrelevance, but Tekky claimed that the financial records were rele-
vant to their state law claim for unfair competition "because punitive dam-
ages are an available remedy for unfair competition" in Illinois.8 In response,
Novelty argued that when state law unfair competition claims mirror claims
made under the Lanham Act, the state law remedies are preempted by the
Lanham Act because punitive damages are disallowed by the Lanham Act.9
After examining the legislative history and the plain language of the Lanham
Act, the district court concluded that "[a]bsent such plain language or evi-
dence of Congressional intent to the contrary, we decline to find that the
Lanham Act preempts remedies under state law, but does not preempt the
state common law itself."1o
Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court found
in favor of Tekky Toys, ultimately awarding them: $116,000 for lost profits
on the copyright infringement claim; $125,000 for lost profits on the trade-
mark infringement claim; $50,000 in punitive damages under the state unfair
competition law; and $575,099.82 in attorneys' fees.I Novelty appealed the
judgment, claiming that the Lanham Act preempted the Illinois punitive dam-
ages remedy for unfair competition. This issue was one of first impression
because "[o]ther courts have upheld awards of punitive damages for unfair
competition when a compensatory award was also given under the Lanham
Act, but none of the courts discussed whether punitive damages should be
available."12
V. COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING AND OVERVIEW OF RATIONALE
After analyzing the statutory language and analogous case law, the Sev-
enth Circuit determined that the Lanham Act did not have broad preemptive
reach and that the additional state law remedies did not interfere with the
enforcement of the Lanham Act.13 Consequently, the court held that the Illi-
nois punitive damage remedy for unfair competition survived the Lanham
Act's prohibition against penalty awards, thus affirming the $50,000 award
for punitive damages.
8. Id. at *4.
9. Id. at *5.
10. Id. at *10-11.
11. JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 913 (7th Cir. 2007).
12. Id. at 918 (alteration in original).
13. Id. at 919.
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VI. COURT'S RATIONALE
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by stating the three circum-
stances under which federal law preempts state law: "(1) when the federal
statute explicitly provides for preemption; (2) when Congress intended to
occupy the field completely; and (3) where state law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."'14 Here, only the third option is pertinent because: (1) the Lanham
Act does not contain a provision explicitly preempting punitive damages
under pendent state law claims; and (2) it has been established that the Lan-
ham Act "does not in general preclude state unfair competition statutes from
operating," so Congress did not intend to exclusively occupy the field of
trademark regulation.15 Therefore, the issue was whether awards of punitive
damages for unfair competition "stand 'as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives'" of the Lanham Act.16
Next, the court took a close look at the language of the statute. The Lanham
Act's remedy scheme provides:
[T]he plaintiff shall be entitled ...subject to the principles of
equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sus-
tained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action .... In as-
sessing damages the court may enter judgment, according to the
circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found as
actual damages, not exceeding three times such amount. If the
court shall find that the amount of the recovery based on profits is
either inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion enter
judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according
to the circumstances of the case. Such sum in either of the above
circumstances shall constitute compensation and not a penalty.17
From the plain language of the statute, the rationale behind the Lanham Act's
remedial scheme is evident: to compensate injury to the plaintiff, not to pe-
nalize the acts of the defendant. Punitive damages by their very nature con-
stitute a penalty; therefore punitive damages are not an available remedy
under the Lanham Act. But the court pointed out that nothing in the lan-
guage of the Lanham Act expressly forbid punitive damage awards under
state law claims, and the statute was not clear as to whether punitive damages
would form "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."18
14. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp., 436 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2006).
16. JCW Invs., 482 F.3d at 918.
17. Id. at 918 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006)).
18. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Subsequently the Seventh Circuit considered the approach taken by the
First Circuit in an analogous case, Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp., which also
involved a question of preemption of state law remedies by the Lanham
Act.19 In the Attrezzi case, the plaintiff prevailed on claims of unfair compe-
tition brought under both state law and the Lanham Act. The First Circuit
awarded the plaintiff attorneys' fees and double damages when the jury
found the defendant had willfully infringed plaintiffs trademark.20 New
Hampshire law awards attorneys' fees to the plaintiff automatically and of-
fers enhanced damages automatically upon a showing of a willful or knowing
violation. In contrast, the Lanham Act allows for attorneys' fees only in
"exceptional cases" and permits enhanced damages awarded in the court's
discretion, "subject to principles of equity."2i The defendant appealed,
claiming that the Lanham Act should preempt the "deviating state rule" with
regard to attorneys' fees and enhanced damages.22
In determining "whether New Hampshire's laxer standard for an award
of attorneys' fees or its mandatory award of enhanced damages undermines
the policy of the federal statute," the court pointed out that, although the
remedial structure was more generous, the state law was substantively the
same as the federal law.23 Since "it is accepted that Congress did not prohibit
state unfair competition statutes that might have substantive terms somewhat
more favorable to plaintiffs than the Lanham Act," the court opined that "to
complain in this case about the modest deviation in remedial benefits
favorable to plaintiffs is to swallow the camel but strain at the gnat."24 The
First Circuit concluded that, because "state substantive regimes are (ordina-
rily) not preempted by the Lanham Act, neither is New Hampshire's tinker-
ing with the remedial components."25
The Seventh Circuit applied the same line of reasoning used by the First
Circuit in Attrezzi to the case at hand. Because the state substantive law
(common law unfair competition) "survives and is coterminous with the fed-
eral law" (the Lanham Act) in the area of trademark regulation, the state law
remedies should also survive.26 The Seventh Circuit concluded, given that
"the Lanham Act has not been interpreted as a statute with broad preemptive
reach," if Congress had intended the Lanham Act to preempt the state law
remedy of punitive damages, it would have clearly expressed it.27
19. Attrezzi, 436 F.3d at 32.
20. Id. at 35-36.
21. Id. at 40 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006)).
22. Id. at 41.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 42.
25. Id.
26. JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 919 (7th Cir. 2007).
27. Id.
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VII. CRITIQUE OF COURT'S APPROACH
At first blush, it does not seem fair that a plaintiff can bring a cause of
action for trademark infringement under both state law and federal law and
recover damages under both, including punitive damages under the state law
claim even though the federal statute expressly bars such damages. This
sounds like "double-dipping." Now, thanks to the Seventh Circuit's holding
in JCW Investments, plaintiffs can easily circumvent the Lanham Act's lim-
ited remedies simply by tacking a state law claim onto their pleadings, pray-
ing for punitive damages, and citing this particular case.
A. Purpose of Lanham Act
Under the test for federal preemption, the Seventh Circuit had to deter-
mine whether allowing state law remedies for punitive damages would stand
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.28 But surprisingly, the JCW Investments court did
not discuss the purpose of the Lanham Act despite the view of another circuit
court that:
Where conflict is alleged between federal and state law, the spe-
cific purpose of the federal act must be ascertained in order to
assess any potential erosion of the federal plan by operation of the
state law. The limited intent of Congress in enacting the Lanham
Act is thus crucial to the discussion in the present case.29
In Mariniello v. Shell Oil, the Third Circuit examined the purpose of the
Lanham Act and looked to the Senate report accompanying the Lanham Act:
The purpose underlying any trademark statute is twofold. One is
to protect the public so it may be confident that ... it will get the
product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the
owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in
presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his invest-
ment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.30
The Mariniello court rejected the argument that Congress intended
"comprehensively to control all aspects of the trademark field" and found
that, "[d]espite the adoption of a uniform federal registration scheme, local
trademarks may be enforced by statute or common law unless conflict devel-
ops with a national trademark."31 The federal preemption rule stated in
28. Id. at 918.
29. Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 F.2d 853, 857-58 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that
Lanham Act did not preempt New Jersey common law protecting franchisees
from termination of franchise agreement without just cause).
30. S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,
1277.
31. Mariniello, 511 F.2d at 857-58.
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Mariniello is that the Lanham Act does not preempt state laws regulating
trademarks unless the "state law would permit confusing or deceptive trade-
marks to operate, infringing on the guarantee of exclusive use to federal
trademark holders . *..."32 Under this analysis, Congress did not intend to
occupy the entire field of trademarks, therefore leaving substantive state law
intact so that states could regulate local trademarks. However, it does not
follow that, by leaving intact substantive state law to regulate local trade-
marks, Congress intended plaintiffs to have recourse under both federal law
and state law for the violation of a national trademark.
B. Legislative History of Lanham Act
An examination of the legislative history can help a court to understand
the purposes and objectives of Congress. However, in deciding JCW Invest-
ments, Justice Wood failed to mention any legislative history of the Lanham
Act. In determining whether to allow punitive damages under a state law
claim that mirrors a claim under the Lanham Act, a court should carefully
consider Congress's reasons for expressly denying that form of relief. The
Second Circuit explored the legislative history of the Act in a case factually
similar to the case at bar. In Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Bartco Petroleum
Corp., Getty Petroleum alleged infringement of their registered trademark in
violation of the Lanham Trademark Act.33 The plaintiff also brought a claim
of unfair competition under the common law and asserted several theories of
recovery under state law.34 Before the issues reached the jury, however,
Getty withdrew all claims except the one based on trademark infringement.35
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Getty and awarded compensatory
damages in the amount of $107,579.75 and $6.5 million total in punitive
damages. 36 Due to the fact that a $6.5 million judgment was "so high as to
shock the judicial conscience" of the court, the district court held a new jury
trial solely on the issue of punitive damages.37 That jury awarded punitive
damages of over $2 million.38 On appeal, the Second Circuit did not address
Getty's argument that "the jury's punitive damage award could be justified
under a common law unfair competition theory and its state law claims."39
Because the jury's special verdict form did not include unfair competition
issues for the jury to decide, "the sole basis for awarding punitive damages
32. Id. at 858.
33. Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Bartco Petroleum Corp., 858 F.2d 103, 105 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 106.
36. Id. at 105.
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was appellants' willful infringement of Getty Petroleum's trademark
rights."40 As such, the issue became whether section 35 of the Lanham Act
permits imposing punitive damages against a trademark infringer.41
The Second Circuit began its examination of the legislative history of
the Lanham Act's remedial provision with a discussion of its predecessor, the
Trademark Act of 1905:42
[Section] 35 of the Lanham Act, currently 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a),
incorporated [section] 16 from the 1905 Act, 33 Stat. 729 (remedy
at law for registered trademark infringement), as well as [section]
19, 33 Stat. 729 (remedy in equity). Both [section] 16 and [sec-
tion] 19 gave the district court discretion to increase an award of
actual damages up to three times its amount .... Section 35 of the
Lanham Act echoes these earlier recovery provisions. Signifi-
cantly, neither [section] 16 nor [section] 19 contained provisions
for punitive damages. 43
The court also pointed out that the provision for discretionary treble damages
in the 1905 Act "was included to enable court to redress fully plaintiffs
whose actual damages were difficult to prove." 44 Concluding its review of
the 1905 Act, the court stated that "the 1905 Act's language, history, and
judicial construction give no affirmative indication that when Congress en-
acted [section] 35 of the Lanham Act - basing its recovery scheme in part on
the 1905 Act - it aimed to furnish punitive damages as a remedy."45
Next the court examined one of the significant additions the drafters of
section 35 made to the Lanham Act: the "caveat that a court's enhancement
of a damage award or adjustment of profits awarded 'shall constitute com-
pensation and not a penalty.' ' '46 The court pointed to several statements
made at subcommittee hearings to show the drafters' fear of unlimited recov-
eries by infringed trademark holders and their desire to limit recoveries
strictly to compensation.47 In conclusion, the Second Circuit held that "[sec-
tion] 35 of the Lanham Act does not authorize an additional award of puni-
tive damages for willful infringement of a registered trademark. So long as
its purpose is to compensate a plaintiff for its actual injuries -even though
40. Id. at 107.
41. Id. at 105.
42. Id. at 110.
43. Id. at 109.
44. Id. at 110.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 111.
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the award is designed to deter wrongful conduct - the Lanham Act remains
remedial."48
Following the reasoning in Getty Petroleum, if the legislative history
supports the conclusion that the purpose of the Lanham Act is purely reme-
dial, then allowing recovery of punitive damages for state law claims would
undermine Congress's purpose - by punishing trademark infringers instead
of compensating the injury to trademark holders. Congress forbade the re-
covery of punitive damages for a specific reason, and a judicial ruling that
allows punitive damages under a state law claim that mirrors the Lanham Act
will only subvert the authority of the legislature.
C. Attorneys' Fees Distinguishable from Punitive Damages
The Seventh Circuit's holding relied on the reasoning used by the First
Circuit in Attrezzi.49 However, the Attrezzi case is distinguishable from JCW
Investments, and the Seventh Circuit made a mistake by attempting to use the
same logic. In Attrezzi, the issue was "whether New Hampshire's laxer stan-
dard for an award of attorneys' fees or its mandatory award of enhanced
damages undermines the policy of the [Lanham Act] . ."50 Unlike punitive
damages, attorneys' fees and enhanced damages are available remedies under
section 35 of the Lanham Act.5' The Lanham Act provides for the prevailing
party to recover attorneys' fees in "exceptional cases"5 2 and allows for treble
damages, at the judge's discretion, subject to the principles of equity.53
Therefore, the New Hampshire statute at issue in Attrezzi, which provided
attorneys' fees and enhanced damages automatically upon a showing of a
willful or knowing violation, did not conflict with the purpose of the Lanham
Act's remedy provision. In response to a U.S. Supreme Court ruling denying
attorneys' fees under the Lanham Act,54 Congress amended the Lanham Act
in 1975 to add a provision that allowed courts to award attorneys' fees.55
The New Hampshire law merely provided a "laxer standard" than the Lan-
ham Act, whereas the Illinois law provided a remedy that was expressly for-
bidden under the Lanham Act. These cases are distinguishable, and the
Seventh Circuit erred in applying the same logic.
48. Id. at 113.
49. JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 919 (7th Cir. 2007).
50. Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp., 436 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2006).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 11 17(a)-(d) (2006).
52. Id. § 1117(a).
53. Id.
54. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 721
(1967).
55. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-600, § 3, 88 Stat. 1955 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006)).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Seventh Circuit's holding in JCW Investments, al-
lowing a plaintiff to recover punitive damages on a claim for trademark in-
fringement brought under both state and federal laws, will only undermine
the Congressional purpose of the Lanham Act. If the Seventh Circuit had
closely examined the legislative history and the purpose of the Lanham Act,
it would have realized that its holding undermines the policy of the federal
statute. The Lanham Act should preempt state law remedies in so far as they
are contrary to the purposes of the Act. Considering the lack of deference to
the purpose and legislative history of the Lanham act and the fact that attor-
neys' fees are distinguishable from punitive damages, it would not be sur-
prising to see JCW Investments overturned.
